αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

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Andrew Chapman
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αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Andrew Chapman »

αὐθέντης occurs near the beginning of a text by Alexander Rhetor (2nd century AD), so I thought I would try reading from the beginning, to see if I could get the gist at least of what he was saying. The text reads [Leonardi Spengel, Rhetores Graeci (Lipsiae: Teubneri 1856), Chapter 18]:
 Ὁ Ἀλέξανδρός φησιν, ὡς δύο ὄντων τῶν ἀνωτάτω προβλημάτων, θέσεώς τε καὶ ὑποθέσεως, καὶ τῆς μὲν θέσεως ζητήσεως οὔσης καθολικῆς ἄνευ προσώπου ὡρισμένου, ὑποθέσεως δὲ ζητήσεως ἐπὶ μέρους ἐν ὡρισμένοις προσώποις, τρεῖς αἱ διαφοραὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν·

ζητοῦσι γὰρ ἅπαντες περὶ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων ἢ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι ἢ περὶ τῶν ὄντων· οὐκοῦν τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποθέσεις, ἐγκώμιον, συμβουλή, δίκη.

διαφέρουσι δ’ αὗται ἀλλήλων τοῖς χρόνοις, τοῖς πράγμασι, τοῖς τέλεσι, τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς, ἐφ’ ὧν οἱ
λόγοι γίγνονται.

τοῖς μὲν δὴ χρόνοις διαφέρουσιν, ὅτι αἱ μέν εἰσιν αἱ δίκαι [καὶ] περὶ τῶν ἤδη γεγονότων, αἱ δὲ
συμβουλαὶ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων, οἱ δὲ ἔπαινοι περὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων· ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἀγαθός, ἀλλὰ καὶ [εἰ] προσδοκῶντες ἔσεσθαι.

τῇ δὲ τῶν χρόνων διαφορᾷ ἕπεται καὶ ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γέγονε πράγματα, τὰ δὲ μέλλει, τὰ δ’ ἐνέστηκεν.

ἔτι δ’ ἔστι τοῦ μὲν ἐγκωμίου ἔπαινος καὶ ψόγος, τῆς δὲ δίκης ἀπολογία καὶ κατηγορία, τῆς δὲ
συμβουλῆς προτροπὴ καὶ ἀποτροπή.

τοῖς δὲ ἀκροαταῖς, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς αὐθένται εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκροώμενοι· βουλεύονται γάρ, τί αὐτοῖς πρακτέον ἐκείνοις καὶ τί μὴ πρακτέον·

ἐν ταῖς δὲ δίκαις οἱ κριταὶ ὡς περὶ ἰδίων σκεπτόμενοι, εἰ πέπρακται τὰ ὑπ’ ἄλλων γενόμενα, κρίνουσιν, ἢ εἰ δικαίως ἢ οὔ·

τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐγκωμίων εἶδος οὔτε αὐθέντας ἔχει οὔτε κριτάς, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀκροατάς, ὅθεν καὶ ἐπιδεικτικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον κέκληται.
And here is my attempt, inadequate though it no doubt is:
Alexander says: As there are two over-arching matters, thesis and foundational supposition, and the thesis being a general discussion without a defined aspect, but the foundational supposition being a discussion with defined aspects in part, there are three natural distinctions to be made.

For all are seeking for the things that have already been, and the things that are about to be, and the things that are; likewise, there are three essential forms of political life: the eulogy/panegyric, the discussion/deliberation, and the court-case/judgement.

But these differ from one another in times, in circumstances, in events, [and] in the hearers, upon whom the speeches come.

Now they differ in respect of time, because the judgements concern things which have already happened, whereas the deliberations concern things which are about to be, and the eulogies concern the things which are and which will be. For we praise, not only if someone is good, but also if we are expecting that they will be.

Also, the difference with respect to circumstances is in accord with the difference in respect to time. For circumstances have been, are about to be, and [currently] are.

But still [with regard to] the public speech, there is [both] praise and censure, [with regard to] judgement (or lawsuit) there is defence and accusation/prosecution, [with regard to] deliberation there is exhortation [persuasion] and dissuasion.

And [they differ] with respect to the listeners, because in deliberations the ones who hear are [also] the ones who speak and act [having autonomy so to do]. For they deliberate upon what is to be done to them and what is not to be done to those ones.

In the court cases, the judges, considering carefully as concerning their own, judge as to whether the things that have occurred have been done by others, or as to whether the things that have happened have occurred justly or not;

{Are these two questions? 1) Was the deed done by the defendant? 2) If it was done by the defendant, did they do it justly or unjustly?}

but the form of public speeches has neither independent actors nor judges, but only hearers, on which account also, such a kind has been called a matter of display [only].
I would much appreciate corrections and improvements. With regard to αὐθέντης, Alexander seems to be bringing out a difference between deliberations and public eulogies. In the latter, the listeners are passive, whereas in deliberations, those who listen also act ie they also speak and thus play an active part in the proceedings. αὐθέντης seems to mean something like 'independent actor' or somesuch. Any thoughts?

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by mwh »

Yes it’s pretty clear what the word means here. The gar clause means "for they deliberate what action is to be taken and what not to be taken by them, themselves" (autois ekeinois dat. of agent).

Next sentence, yes 2 Q’s: “if the deeds of others [NB up’allwn sandwiched within ta … genomena] have in fact been committed, or [sc. if it’s given that they have], if (they’ve been committed) justly or not.”

For thesis:hypothesis and schematic analysis of the kinds of political speeches (not “political life”), George Kennedy’s book will make a good starting point or at least guide you to where to look, or better there's Lausberg's Handbuch, for which you scarcely need German. Such arid merisms and diaforai are everywhere, the ancient rhetorical handbook composers are always arguing with one another, almost as bad as bible scholars. Mildly interesting that encomium has displaced the traditional epideictic alongside deliberative and forensic (and that it should be absurdly subdivided into praise and blame). Everything's divided (and subdivided ...) into either two or three.

h "or", not "and." They're alternatives, it's a taxonomy.

pragmata are events, actions, telh are ends i.e. aims, goals.
… “For some events have taken place, others will in future, others are underway.”

peri idiwn concerning private matters [as distinct from public, as in sumboulai]

“the genre of encomia has neither doers/agents/actors nor judges/deciders but only listeners, which is why such genre is also called epideictic.”

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Andrew Chapman »

Much appreciated, Michael. I have incorporated your changes, as best I can. I will have a look at Kennedy and Lausberg (who I see has been translated, and has an index to Greek terms). I have just seen that Liddell and Scott give 'general question: special case' for 'θέσις: ὐπόθεσις, which also makes sense of what Alexander seems to be saying in the first sentence. Not sure how to convey those two words in English: but I guess that is what my homework is for. I just found this in the Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, pp 219-20:
Like philosophers, rhetoricians train their pupils for discussing general and specific subjects. These exercises are called θέσις and ὑποθέσις [sic: accent?] respectively. A θέσις, or an undefined question (quaestio infinita), is 'Should one marry?' or 'Do gods exist?', but 'Should Cato marry?' is a ὑποθέσις because undefined (finita). [Cic. Or. 45-6]
So does τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποθέσεις mean something like 'there are three specific forms of political speeches'?

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Qimmik »

So does τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων τρεῖς εἰσιν ὑποθέσεις mean something like 'there are three specific forms of political speeches'?
"All seek [to address] past, future or present matters, and there are specific forms (ὑποθέσεις) of political speeches [maybe better 'three specific grounds or bases for political speeches']: speeches praising or attacking an individual [which he refers to as ἐγκώμιον, which usually means 'a speech praising an individual'], speeches advocating or opposing a policy (συμβουλή), and forensic/courtroom speeches (δίκη)."

He has to divide ἐγκώμιον (which usually means just "praise") into praise and blame for the sake of symmetry, because he also divides δίκη and συμβουλή into pro and con categories! This is what mwh refers to as "arid merisms and diaforai." προτροπὴ καὶ ἀποτροπή -- "advocacy of and opposition to a policy."

τοῖς δὲ ἀκροαταῖς, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς αὐθένται εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκροώμενοι· βουλεύονται γάρ, τί αὐτοῖς πρακτέον ἐκείνοις καὶ τί μὴ πρακτέον· -- "[With respect to] the audience, because in deliberative assemblies, those who listen are in authority/have the authority to decide, for they are deliberating on what they themselves ought to do and what they ought not to do."

ἐν ταῖς δὲ δίκαις οἱ κριταὶ ὡς περὶ ἰδίων σκεπτόμενοι, εἰ πέπρακται τὰ ὑπ’ ἄλλων γενόμενα, κρίνουσιν, ἢ εἰ δικαίως ἢ οὔ· -- "In lawsuits, the judges, as they are conducting an inquiry (σκεπτόμενοι) about private matters, judge as to (1) whether acts that happened by the agency of others were actually done, or (2) [if they were in fact done,] whether they were done lawfully [δικαίως] or not." Yes, two questions.

τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐγκωμίων εἶδος οὔτε αὐθέντας ἔχει οὔτε κριτάς, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀκροατάς, ὅθεν καὶ ἐπιδεικτικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον κέκληται. -- "The genre [εἶδος, using mwh's translation, le mot juste] of encomia has neither individuals with authority to make policy decisions [αὐθέντας] nor judges, but only listeners, whence such genre is also called 'epideictic'."

This doesn't add much, if anything, to mwh's translations, but I thought maybe I might clarify a few points, if only for my own sake.
Last edited by Qimmik on Mon Oct 20, 2014 1:20 pm, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Andrew Chapman »

Thanks, Qimmik, and thanks for further explaining mwh's point that the division of encomium was only for the sake of consistency with the other two types of speech.

With regard to αὐθέντης, I can seen now that it could refer to someone with authority to decide. But it can also refer to someone who acts, and I had thought the idea was of being active rather than passive in a situation. I was thinking particularly of αὐθεντέω in Aristonicus's comment on The Iliad 9.694:

ὅτι ἐξ ἄλλων τόπων ἐστὶν ὁ στίχος· νῦν γὰρ οὐχ ἁρμόζει· τότε γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐπιφωνεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου καταπληκτικά τινα προενέγκηται. νῦν δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐπὶ Ὀδυσσέως λέγοιτο τοῦ μηνύοντος τὰ ὑπ’ Ἀχιλλέως εἰρημένα; [L. Friedländer, Aristonici Περὶ σημείων Ἰλιάδος reliquiae emendatiores. (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1853) 170]

where he argues that the line is an interpolation (agreed by some more recent commentators, but not all). It is generally said that ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου refers to the one doing the speaking, although it is interesting that the idea of mastery may be in the original text:

ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἳ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι: μάλα γὰρ κρατερῶς ἀγόρευσε.

So spake he, and they all became hushed in silence marvelling at his words; for full masterfully did he address their gathering. [A T Murray]

So perhaps ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου could be carrying the idea of speaking in a masterly way?

There are also four instances in Diodorus Siculus and Polybius where αὐθέντης seems to refer to the doer (author, perpetrator, sponsor in Loeb), eg:

Ὅτι ὁ Γράκχος δημηγορήσας περὶ τοῦ καταλῦσαι ἀριστοκρατίαν, δημοκρατίαν δὲ συστῆσαι, καὶ φικόμενος τῆς ἁπάντων εὐχρηστίας τῶν μερῶν, οὐκέτι συναγωνιστὰς ἀλλὰ καθάπερ αὐθέντας εἶχε τούτους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἰδίας τόλμης. [Diodorus Siculus Hist., Bibliotheca historica. Book 34/35 chapter 25 section 1 line 4.]

Gracchus, having delivered public harangues on the subject of abolishing aristocratic rule and establishing democracy, and having won credit with all classes, had in these men no longer mere supporters but rather sponsors of his own daring plans. [Loeb]

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

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So perhaps ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου could be carrying the idea of speaking in a masterly way?
In the passage from Aristonicus, I don't think ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου necessarily carries any suggestion of masterly speaking -- it just seems to mean "speaking in his own words," i.e., not reporting the speech of someone else.

9.693-4 are identical to 8.28-9, where Zeus is speaking to the assembly of the gods, enjoining them not to aid either the Greeks or the Trojans and threatening them with dire punishment if they disobey. These lines read:

So he spoke. All became silent,
amazed at his speech, for he spoke very forcefully.

The second half of 8.29, "for he spoke very forcefully," is obviously appropriate in the context of Zeus' speech. Aristonicus' point is that it isn't appropriate in the context of Odysseus' speech because he's merely reporting to the Greeks what Achilles said when Odysseus and Ajax went to his tent (the "embassy") to try to persuade him to return to the fighting--that Achilles would not come to the aid of the beleaguered Greeks--along with Achilles' threat to sail for home the next day (a threat that he didn't carry out).

For Aristonicus, as for other scholars ancient and contemporary (including M.L. West and others), the repetition of 8.29 in a context where it doesn't seem wholly appropriate gives rise to the suspicion that it has been interpolated after 9.693. No one doubts that 9.693 is appropriate because the Greeks are thunderstruck by Achilles' words as reported by Odysseus. However, the Homeric texts are full of examples of "concordance interpolation," where a line is thought to have been interpolated at some point in the history of the texts where it follows another line or group of lines that is repeated from elsewhere but doesn't quite belong in the interpolated slot.

Aristonicus says that "for he spoke very forcefully" would only be appropriate for the author of a speech, i.e., for someone speaking in his own words, not for someone merely reporting the words of someone else. In my view, that's what ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου means here.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Andrew Chapman »

Thanks, Qimmik. The one commentator I found who defends the verse is Hainsworth.

Do you think this kind of meaning - author, agent, doer - is a possibility in the Alexander text:

τοῖς δὲ ἀκροαταῖς, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς αὐθένται εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκροώμενοι· βουλεύονται γάρ, τί αὐτοῖς πρακτέον ἐκείνοις καὶ τί μὴ πρακτέον·

Could αὐθένται just refer to the fact that the members of a deliberative assembly are all active in the discussion - all author speeches of their own, one might say - rather than to their being possessors of decision-making authority?

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

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Could αὐθένται just refer to the fact that the members of a deliberative assembly are all active in the discussion - all author speeches of their own, one might say - rather than to their being possessors of decision-making authority?
Alexander is discussing "symbouleutic" rhetoric here. That was a conventional category of rhetoric involving speeches addressing policy issues delivered before deliberative bodies, not dialogues among the members. He's discussing the audience of the rhetor--he observes that in the context of deliberative assemblies the members of the audience have decision-making authority, just as judges in the courtroom have authority to render judgments--but the audience for praise/blame speeches, he notes, aren't engaged in a decision-making process at all. Here, I think, Alexander uses αὐθένται in the sense of "having decision-making authority," rather than in the sense that they have the ability to speak on their own. I don't think he's necessarily envisioning a scenario where the members of the assembly have a turn at speaking themselves--the essential point is that they are the ones with authority for the decision. The focus is on the rhetor, and It's the rhetor who does the speaking--presumably Alexander is going to address how the rhetor should construct his speech when targeting each of the three different types of audiences that he distinguishes.

This is of course the 2d century CE, not 5th or 4th century Athenian democracy, but even in that era in which he was writing there would have been many opportunities for politicians/rhetores to address deliberative bodies, whether assembled masses of citizens or councils of one sort or another or other groups responsible for making decisions. These types of institutions, particularly at the local level, continued to coexist with an autocratic central power.

There is a slight difference in this respect from αὐθεντῶν in Aristonicus, which in context means something like "speaking his own mind," as opposed to reporting the words of someone else.

With regard to concordance interpolations, we've had a discussion about these right here:

viewtopic.php?f=22&t=61640

I tend to prefer a more conservative approach than my arch-enemy Paul Derouda, who wants to slash the Iliad and the Odyssey to pieces.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

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ὅτι ἐξ ἄλλων τόπων ἐστὶν ὁ στίχος· νῦν γὰρ οὐχ ἁρμόζει· τότε γὰρ εἴωθεν ἐπιφωνεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου καταπληκτικά τινα προενέγκηται. νῦν δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐπὶ Ὀδυσσέως λέγοιτο τοῦ μηνύοντος τὰ ὑπ’ Ἀχιλλέως εἰρημένα;

" . . . the verse is interpolated from somewhere else. Here, it doesn't fit. It's usually uttered when someone, speaking in his own words [ὁ αὐθεντῶν τοῦ λόγου], comes forth with something astonishing. Here, how could it be said of Odysseus when he is reporting what Achilles said?"

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Andrew Chapman »

Qimmik wrote:
Alexander is discussing "symbouleutic" rhetoric here. That was a conventional category of rhetoric involving speeches addressing policy issues delivered before deliberative bodies, not dialogues among the members. He's discussing the audience of the rhetor--he observes that in the context of deliberative assemblies the members of the audience have decision-making authority, just as judges in the courtroom have authority to render judgments--but the audience for praise/blame speeches, he notes, aren't engaged in a decision-making process at all. Here, I think, Alexander uses αὐθένται in the sense of "having decision-making authority," rather than in the sense that they have the ability to speak on their own. I don't think he's necessarily envisioning a scenario where the members of the assembly have a turn at speaking themselves--the essential point is that they are the ones with authority for the decision. The focus is on the rhetor, and It's the rhetor who does the speaking--presumably Alexander is going to address how the rhetor should construct his speech when targeting each of the three different types of audiences that he distinguishes.
Thanks, Bill, that makes sense. I was imagining something more like a Prime Minister's Cabinet meeting. So would the rhetor be without decision-making authority himself? Sorry for my ignorance. Or would he be a member of the decision-making body?

Thanks, Andrew

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

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I was imagining something more like a Prime Minister's Cabinet meeting. So would the rhetor be without decision-making authority himself? Sorry for my ignorance. Or would he be a member of the decision-making body?
I think any of the scenarios you described could have occurred somewhere in the Roman empire in the second century CE.

Especially at the local level, the imperial regime allowed a great deal of autonomy for managing public affairs, relying on local institutions and elites to keep things under control. In many cases, local or even provincial affairs, and to a limited extent even empire-wide matters in Rome itself, were managed by senatorial bodies--oligarchic assemblies voting on matters of public policy, in which politicians delivered speeches advocating one course or another. And it's not inconceivable, I think, that even some form of democratic institutions could have persisted in some places--where the assembled body of citizens made decisions within the framework of imperial control.

All of this activity would have occurred within the limitations of the imperial autocracy, but the second century CE was the era of the "good" emperors, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius and Marcus.

However, I believe that the speeches that have been preserved from the period after the end of Athenian autonomy in the 4th century BCE are largely of the epideictic variety--showpieces by public speakers such as Aelius Aristides, who lived in the 2d century CE--a period of relative prosperity and a fairly vigorous revival of literary activity known as the "Second Sophistic." Libanius was active in the 4th century AD.

Epideictic speeches were cultivated as a form of entertainment, either for public delivery or private reading. And, in fact, if I'm not mistaken, forensic and deliberative speeches were also written during this period for the same recreational purposes, based on imaginary or historical scenarios. The authors of these display pieces made a point of adhering (or purporting to adhere) to the linguistic standards of 5th and 4th century BCE Attic Greek, not admitting into their literary productions any words that could not be found in Attic prose works of that period, and observing Attic syntax--duals, optatives, etc.--in an age when koiné was the spoken and written standard.

To some extent, however, it's possible that Alexander Rhetor's discussions of symbouleutic--deliberative--rhetoric reflect a historical genre that was less practiced in his day than in the golden age of the Attic orators--a classification that may no longer have been of so much practical consequence, but one that had been established in the text-books and therefore had to be mentioned and discussed. (Again, sterile merisms and diaphorai.) On the other hand, it's probably equally true that symbouleutic speeches, to the extent that there were opportunities for this type of rhetoric, did not involve the kinds of existential issues that called forth the efforts of Demosthenes and other 4th century rhetores--the Olynthiacs, the Phillipics, etc. (Even in the fourth century, works that were classified as symbouleutic were really political pamphlets that were never delivered as speeches. Isocrates, for example, never delivered a speech in his entire career if I'm not mistaken.)

Of course, the one branch of rhetoric that must have been in continuous practice throughout the Roman period and beyond was forensic rhetoric--the courts continued to operate even under regimes where there was little opportunity for purely "symbouleutic" rhetoric. (And the traditional distinction between forensic and deliberative rhetoric is really somewhat illusory--both are aimed at persuading a decision-making audience.)

The Greeks of all periods, from Homer (and especially Homer!) into the Byzantine era, enjoyed rhetoric, in a way that is difficult for us to imagine.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aelius_Aristides

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libanius

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sophistic

Perhaps mwh could add something here or correct any misunderstandings on my part.

Addendum: Although I'm not very knowledgeable about this, I think that many of the Church Fathers were educated in the Greek rhetorical tradition, and their writings bear evidence of this. Their sermons and homilies represent a kind of continuation or extension of the symbouleutic genre.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Andrew Chapman »

Thanks very much, Bill. I will dip into Kennedy and Lausberg today and see if there is perhaps a short introduction that would fill in some of the background. I gather from what you say that Alexander's reference may not be to the real-life decision-making of his day but to ancient forms, as practised in classical times and then come into classical literature and philosophy.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

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"I gather from what you say that Alexander's reference may not be to the real-life decision-making of his day but to ancient forms, as practised in classical times and then come into classical literature and philosophy."

Well, there must have been many opportunities and much demand for persuasive public speaking in all periods. And the survival of such a large body of speeches from the golden age of Attic oratory (although most of it is forensic) surely attests to the need rhetorical training for a multitude of purposes.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Paul Derouda »

Just a comment on concordance interpolations. Sorry to veer (somewhat) off-topic, but I cannot resist the challenge of my arch-foe Qimmik.

In the Oxford commentary on the Odyssey, Hainsworth writes (p. 263, on Od. 5.83-84):

"83-4. = 157-8. 157 is omitted by many MSS, and the scholl. to the present passage condemn 84 as superfluous (περιττός). The asyndeton is certainly harsh, but the Alexandrians were commonly offended at repeated groups of lines and dealt with them by omitting from one passage the lines they retained in the other: see van der Valk, Textual Criticism, 221."

Isn't this statement a bit confused? For one, if this were true, wouldn't we expect to find more inconsistency in the lines that are transmitted, some manuscripts omitting the lines at one place and other manuscripts at another? As far as I know, this not the case, or if so, rarely.

Although Hainsworth seems to me a worthy scholar otherwise, I think he's falling into a common trap here. As for the consequences of this, let me quote M.J. Apthorp, The Manuscript Evidence for Interpolation in Homer, p. 217-8:

"There is widespread ignorance among Homerists about the true significance of weak attestation by our MSS. Sometimes, indeed, a passage is discussed without even any apparent awareness of the weakness in its attestation. Formula-analysis, literary criticism and discussions about the genesis and early transmission of the poems have often been seriously marred by this ignorance."

The way I see it, I only want to accept the complexities of the transmission of the Homeric corpus, that we can't take the text we have for granted. I suppose Qimmik does too, but difference between our views is how far we accept that these complexities can ever be discerned, Qimmik being more conservative than I.

Sorry, I don't really have anything to add on αὐθέντης. I suppose we'll need a new thread, if we want to continue this discussion...

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Qimmik »

Paul, I was wondering when you were going to notice . . .

The Homeric poems just aren't like other texts. Leaving aside the problem of how the texts originated and their pre-Alexandrian history, there are so many manuscripts--and there must have been even more in the centuries between the Alexandrian age and late antiquity--that it doesn't seem to be possible, and probably wouldn't be useful anyway, to try to establish affiliations in the way that is done for other texts (as Allen tried to do in a very superficial way that has received no end of criticism). So we know very little specific about the history of the texts in any period.

It strikes me (and I recognize that a number of scholars who know more about these things than I do don't agree) that there is a certain amount of risk in rejecting lines on the basis of "weak" attestation, expecially where a line is omitted in just one or in very few mss. How can we be sure that the line wasn't dropped in one strain of the tradition just on someone's whim or an ill-founded hunch? And why should we be so certain that the "original" texts didn't include repeated lines in contexts where they might be slightly inappropriate, like the second half of 9.694?

The first half seems unexceptionnable--the Greeks, at the low ebb of their fortunes and in dire need of Achilles' return to the fighting, would have been shocked at Achilles' response, particularly his threat to sail for home; it's only the second half of the verse that seems slightly problematic. But perhaps it was Aristonicus' remark that set in motion the chain of manuscrit omissions of this line leading to its weak attestation.

That's why I prefer a more conservative approach to editing Homer.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Paul Derouda »

Qimmik wrote:How can we be sure that the line wasn't dropped in one strain of the tradition just on someone's whim or an ill-founded hunch?
We can't. It's a matter of probabilities. Most of the time we'll be right but sometimes we'll throw the baby with the bathwater. But although I would personally love to rip the Venetus A into tiny pieces, M.L. West and others limit themselves to bracketing lines in their own editions, leaving the pleasure of slashing the book to the reader.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by mwh »

Hainsworth’s error was an error of fact, in alleging that “the Alexandrians were commonly offended at repeated groups of lines and dealt with them by omitting from one passage the lines they retained in the other.” They did not omit such passages, they merely obelized them, and noted the recurrence (as does Aristonicus here, reporting Aristarchus). The lines stayed in the text. And I don’t know of a case where περιττον notations led to subsequent excision. There’s very little evidence for the deliberate dropping of lines, certainly not after Aristonicus. Quite apart from the fact that if someone had taken them them out, someone else would have put them back in.

As I see it, absence signifies, presence doesn't.

—But this is quite the wrong board for this. Apologies to Andrew.

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Andrew Chapman »

Hainsworth on Iliad 9.694:
Zenodotus (Did/AT) did not read this verse but, as usual, it was read but athetized by Aristophanes and Aristarchus. Their objection was that κρατερῶς described the manner of Akhilleus, not that of Odysseus: true, but the objection fails to take account ot the habits of formular composition. ..
The Alexander passage is remarkably close to Aristotle on Rhetoric, I.3:
Ἔστιν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἴδη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες. σύγ- κειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρὸς τοῦτόν ἐστιν, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκ- κλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων [οἷον] ὁ δικαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός, ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν.

συμβουλῆς δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπή, τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή· ἀεὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰδίᾳ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῇ δημηγοροῦντες τούτων θάτερον ποιοῦσιν. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία, τὸ δ’ ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὁποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος. χρόνοι δὲ ἑκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβου- λεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων), τῷ δὲ δικαζομένῳ ὁ γενόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεὶ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ’ ἐπιδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ παρών (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσιν ἢ ψέγουσιν πάντες), προσχρῶνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀνα- μιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες.
Rhys Roberts:
Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making--speaker, subject, and person addressed--it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.
This seems to support qimmik's case that it is decision-making that is in view, with regard to the hearers in the assemblies: 'ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτὴν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστιν δ’ ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής, ..'.

Either θεωρός or κριτής.

Andrew

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Re: αὐθέντης in Alexander Rhetor.

Post by Qimmik »

It looks as if Alexander was simply regurgitating Aristotle's classifications--but Aristotle didn't have the word αὐθέντης at his disposal because it had not yet assumed the meaning of "persons with authority to make decisions". In Aristotle's day, it probably still meant "murderer."

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