In this short (very short) paper, Kosman argues that in the below passage ὁ θεὸς and ὁ νοῦς function as predicates, and not as subjects, as they are usually understood. But doesn't the fact that the God and the Intellect have articles count as evidence against Kosman's claim? Aren't we more likely to identify that which has the article as the subject and the other nominative as the predicate?
Nicomachean Ethics, 1096a23-27: ἔτι δ᾽ ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ᾽ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.
Here is the Ross translation, which takes the standard interpretation, the interpretation which Kosman argues against: Further, since things are said to be good in as many ways as they are said to be (for things are called good both in the category of substance, as God and reason, and in quality, e.g. the virtues, and in quantity, e.g. that which is moderate, and in relation, e.g. the useful, and in time, e.g. the right opportunity, and in place, e.g. the right locality and the like), clearly the good cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it would not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only.
Here is a link to Kosman's paper: https://drive.google.com/open?id=1eOd_X ... 0OlkHQbTNB
ὁ θεὸς and ὁ νοῦς as predicates
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Re: ὁ θεὸς and ὁ νοῦς as predicates
hairetikon -
I'm on very shaky ground here, but I'll venture this:
Kosman (and thanks for the citation, I enjoyed trying to work through his argument) is making an interpretative point, not a grammatical one. ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, αἱ ἀρεταί, τὸ μέτριον, etc. are different (disguised) ways, corresponding to the different categories, of saying something is good (specifically, as many {ἰσαχῶς} disguised ways as there are of saying something 'is'). In the category of substance (ἐν τῷ τί), for it to be said (predicated) of something that it is God and intelligence is a disguised way or predicating that it is good. In the category of quality (ἐν τῷ ποιῷ), for it to be said of something that it is one of the virtues (e.g., Socrates is courageous) is a disguised way of predicating that it is good. Etc.
In sum, ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, αἱ ἀρεταί, τὸ μέτριον, etc. are to be understood as exemplary predicates (of things in the respective categories) that equate to goodness, not as exemplary subjects of which 'good' is explicitly predicated.
I suppose it would have been nice of Kosman to paraphrase the passage with this interpretation in mind, in order to contrast it with the Ross and Ostwald translations he cites.
I'm on very shaky ground here, but I'll venture this:
Kosman (and thanks for the citation, I enjoyed trying to work through his argument) is making an interpretative point, not a grammatical one. ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, αἱ ἀρεταί, τὸ μέτριον, etc. are different (disguised) ways, corresponding to the different categories, of saying something is good (specifically, as many {ἰσαχῶς} disguised ways as there are of saying something 'is'). In the category of substance (ἐν τῷ τί), for it to be said (predicated) of something that it is God and intelligence is a disguised way or predicating that it is good. In the category of quality (ἐν τῷ ποιῷ), for it to be said of something that it is one of the virtues (e.g., Socrates is courageous) is a disguised way of predicating that it is good. Etc.
In sum, ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, αἱ ἀρεταί, τὸ μέτριον, etc. are to be understood as exemplary predicates (of things in the respective categories) that equate to goodness, not as exemplary subjects of which 'good' is explicitly predicated.
I suppose it would have been nice of Kosman to paraphrase the passage with this interpretation in mind, in order to contrast it with the Ross and Ostwald translations he cites.
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Re: ὁ θεὸς and ὁ νοῦς as predicates
Thats how I understood it.RandyGibbons wrote:Kosman (and thanks for the citation, I enjoyed trying to work through his argument) is making an interpretative point, not a grammatical one.
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Re: ὁ θεὸς and ὁ νοῦς as predicates
Further, since ‘good’ is mentioned in as many ways as ‘being’, (for, in the category of substance, ‘good’ is called ‘God’ and ‘ the intellect’, and in quality, ‘virtues’, and in quantity, ‘moderate’, and in relation, ‘useful’, and in time, ‘opportune’, and in place, ‘[suitable] residence’, and the like), it is clear that ‘good’ could not be something universally common and [at the same time]single, for then it could not be mentioned in all the categories but in one only.
It has been a very long time since Aristotle was translated, a new translation is urgently needed.
It has been a very long time since Aristotle was translated, a new translation is urgently needed.
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